Säpo names Russia top threat, warns Iran recruiting Swedish gang criminals as proxy assassins

• Säpo's new threat assessment highlights Russian sabotage as the primary risk to Swedish security
• Iran is actively recruiting Swedish gang criminals to target Iranian dissidents and other objectives in Sweden
• The threat level is expected to rise further depending on developments in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine
• The Iran-gangs nexus shows Sweden's organised crime problem and foreign state interference are no longer separate issues

Sweden's Security Service, Säkerhetspolisen (Säpo), on Wednesday released its latest threat assessment identifying Russia as the single greatest security threat to the country, with specific warnings about sabotage operations on Swedish territory. The same report flags a second, less expected danger: Iran's recruitment of Swedish gang criminals to carry out attacks against Iranian exiles and other targets inside Sweden. Sveriges Radio reports that Säpo sees both threats intensifying, driven by the war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East.

The Russia assessment will surprise no one who has followed Nordic security debates since February 2022. Sweden's rapid pivot from two centuries of non-alignment to NATO membership was driven precisely by the recognition that Russian aggression had moved from theoretical to operational. Sabotage risks — against infrastructure, undersea cables, energy systems — have been discussed extensively across all Nordic capitals. What Säpo's report does is formalise what defence planners have been saying privately: Sweden is a target, not merely a bystander.

The Iran dimension is more revealing. Swedish gang violence has been treated primarily as a domestic law-and-order problem — failed integration, drug markets, territorial disputes in segregated suburbs. Säpo's assessment reframes part of that violence as a foreign intelligence operation. Tehran, the agency warns, is already using Swedish criminal networks as proxies, outsourcing assassination and intimidation work to people who know the terrain, have access to weapons, and operate below the threshold that would trigger a conventional counterintelligence response. The implications are serious: Sweden's gang problem is not just a social crisis but a national security vulnerability that foreign states are actively exploiting.

The threat is not abstract. In March, Gothenburg's traditional Persian New Year fire festival — Chaharshanbe Suri — was cancelled after organisers cited security concerns related to threats against the Iranian exile community. The cancellation drew limited media attention at the time, treated as a local event management decision rather than what it more likely was: evidence that Iranian state pressure is successfully suppressing diaspora life in Sweden's second-largest city.

Säpo's future threat projection ties both strands to geopolitical developments. Escalation in the Middle East would increase Iranian operations on European soil. Continued war in Ukraine keeps Russian hybrid warfare — including sabotage, cyberattacks, and influence operations — at elevated levels. Sweden sits at the intersection of both vectors.

The question the report does not answer is what, concretely, the Swedish security apparatus intends to do beyond publishing annual assessments. Säpo has roughly 1,500 employees covering counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and protective security for a country of 10.5 million. The agency has been warning about Iranian threats to exiles for years; the gang recruitment channel adds a layer of complexity that demands resources Sweden has not yet committed. Identifying Russia as the top threat is a statement of the obvious. Stopping Iranian intelligence from hiring hitmen out of Biskopsgården or Rinkeby is an operational challenge of a different order entirely.

Gothenburg's Iranian community could not light a bonfire for New Year. Säpo, meanwhile, produced a report.

Sources: Sveriges Radio Ekot