Sweden's carbon capture bets collapse, more than half of major CCS projects paused or cancelled

• More than half of Sweden's largest CCS projects have been paused or cancelled, according to SVT's investigation
• Climate researcher Mathias Fridahl says Swedish policymakers are placing excessive faith in unproven technology
• Norway's Longship project, backed by state infrastructure investment, is years ahead of Sweden's stalled private-sector bets
• Sweden's net-zero 2045 target now has a structural gap between political commitments and industrial delivery capacity

Sweden has promised to reach net-zero emissions by 2045, and carbon capture and storage sits at the centre of that plan. An investigation by SVT now reveals that more than half of the country's largest CCS projects have been paused or cancelled outright — a finding that turns the government's climate arithmetic from ambitious to fictional.

The gap between Sweden's political targets and its industrial capacity is not a surprise to anyone who has followed the money. CCS is extraordinarily capital-intensive: capturing CO₂ from industrial flue gases, compressing it, transporting it, and injecting it into geological formations deep underground requires not just engineering breakthroughs but sustained, patient investment over decades. Private companies considering CCS in Sweden have looked at the economics and walked away. The subsidies on offer were enough to launch press releases and feasibility studies, but not enough to justify the billions needed for full-scale deployment. Climate researcher Mathias Fridahl, quoted by SVT, put it plainly: Swedish policymakers are hoping for too much from a technology that has not yet delivered at scale. The net-zero timeline, in his assessment, rests on optimistic assumptions rather than proven capacity.

The contrast with Norway is instructive. Oslo's Longship project — the largest CCS initiative in Europe — is not a collection of private-sector bets waiting for the right subsidy signal. It is a state-backed infrastructure programme with a dedicated CO₂ transport and storage facility at the Northern Lights site off the Norwegian coast. Norway committed around 17 billion kroner of public money, took the construction risk, and built the pipeline and injection wells before asking industry to sign up as customers. The facility received its first shipment of captured CO₂ earlier this year. Norway, in other words, built the road before asking people to drive on it. Sweden announced the destination and assumed the road would build itself.

The Swedish approach followed a familiar pattern: set an ambitious target, announce that emerging technology will close the gap, offer subsidies calibrated to political cycles rather than engineering timelines, and count the resulting project announcements as evidence of progress. When private companies do the actual cost-benefit analysis — factoring in construction risk, uncertain carbon pricing, regulatory delays, and the absence of transport and storage infrastructure — the numbers do not work. The subsidies reduce risk at the margins; they do not eliminate it. Capital markets understood this long before the political class acknowledged it.

What remains is a net-zero target with a hole in the middle. Sweden's 2045 commitment assumed CCS would handle emissions from cement, steel, and waste incineration — sectors where electrification alone cannot do the job. With those projects stalling, the government faces a choice between revising the target, finding alternative abatement, or doubling down with substantially larger public investment on the Norwegian model. Each option carries political costs that the original target was designed to avoid.

Norway spent 17 billion kroner and has a functioning CO₂ injection site under the North Sea. Sweden spent years drafting strategies and now has a collection of paused feasibility studies. The 2045 target remains on the books.

Sources: SVT Nyheter